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Abstract 
There is importance and timeliness in the issue of 
Internet taxation.  Internet commerce is growing 
exponentially.  With this growth comes the potential for 
tremendous tax revenue, as well as criticism for receiving 
an unfair tax advantage. One of the benefits of the 
Internet is its lack of national and geographical 
boundaries.  However, this lack of boundaries makes 
taxation and regulation of the Internet difficult, as 
historically geographical boundaries have helped to 
determine policies.  One of the needs of a taxation policy 
for e-commerce is that it is consistent with established 
taxation policies both domestically and internationally.  
The tax policy chosen for internet commerce in the U.S. 
will, as a result, affect not only the internet commerce in 
the U.S., but also other forms of commerce within and 
outside of the U.S.  This paper will address the 
implications of the current tax exemption on efficiency 
and social welfare.   
 
1. Introduction 
To encourage growth and research into the World 
Wide Web and e-commerce, the U.S. government has not 
been requiring the taxation of commerce that transpires on 
the Internet. The Internet Tax Freedom Act has placed a 
moratorium on taxes on the Internet until the year 2001. 
The existence of e-commerce may result in significant 
changes in the current tax system, according to Plock 
(1998).  The World Trade Organization and members 
thereof (such as the U.S.) are pushing for the Internet to 
be tariff free. The tax policy for Internet commerce that is 
being promoted is the residence-based tax that is currently 
being used for other means of commerce. (Plock, 1998) 
"A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce," written 
by an unknown author for the U.S. government, states that 
there are three fundamental principles behind the US's 
stand on Internet commerce taxation.  The first is that the 
tax should not hinder or distort commerce, and it should 
not create incentives for commerce with firms regarding 
geographical location, or the nature of specific businesses.  
The second principle is that it should be "simple and 
transparent." The third principle is that the tax policy 
should accommodate U.S. and foreign tax policies that are 
already in affect.  The government paper, (1997) also 
expressed a concern that any tax would inhibit Internet 
growth and technological advance. As a result, consumers 
are not always required to pay any taxes on the goods that 
they purchase off of web sites.  The same goods, in many 
cases, may also be purchased from a catalog or in a store.  
However, the store and the catalog are required to charge 
some sort of tax.  State sales tax for mail order sales as 
well as physical stores is enforced by federal law, while 
any state tax on e-commerce is not enforceable. This 
means that the customer will pay a lower price on goods 
they purchase on the web of approximately the tax rate 
times the price of the goods. This tax break will cause 
consumers that are indifferent between purchasing goods 
off of the web and from a store or a catalog to do business 
on the web (Caruso, 1998). The fact that consumers must 
pay an additional shipping charge is not addressed in this 
paper, as it is considered a cost of doing business, and not 
an artificial cost advantage.   So, it is possible that a 
company will be selling a good at a higher price on the 
Internet even with the tax exemption. 
The shift in consumer demand to goods sold via the 
web from goods sold via stores or catalogs due to this tax 
exemption has implications in the arenas of social 
welfare, efficiency, and tax revenue. In this paper, the 
impact of the tax-exempt status of sales of goods via the 
web on social welfare and efficiency will be addressed.  
 
2. Models and Hypotheses 




The consideration of the tax-exempt status of Internet 
commerce (as outlined in the Internet Tax Freedom Act) 
as a subsidy is argued by the consideration of taxes and 
subsidies in the following discussion of two papers.  The 
first paper is written by EEI Resources, and is an 
explanation of the subsidy effect of tax exemptions and 
other preferences given to government-owned utilities.  
The second paper, by Magnusson, is a discussion of a 
ruling against the U.S. by the World Trade Organization 
in which the tax exemptions allowed in certain sections of 
the U.S. tax code were found to be a trade subsidy. 
A subsidy, by nature, is something that artificially 
gives one or more companies a cost advantage over 
its/their competitors’ costs of production of goods or 
services.  EEI Resources found that this definition fits the 
use of tax exemptions in the electricity industry.  In the 
instance of the electricity industry, government-owned 
utilities were given tax exemptions as well as other 
preferences that allowed the government-owned utilities 
to have a cost advantage over other utilities.  This 
artificial cost advantage caused other utilities to not be 
Hypothesis #1  The Tax exemption on the sale of 
goods over the internet acts as a subsidy. 
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able to compete successfully against the government-
owned utility.  (EEI, 1999) 
One can consider the tax exemption given to Internet 
commerce as a subsidy. Companies that sell goods over 
the Internet are in competition with companies that sell 
the same good via catalogs or stores.  Catalog companies 
and stores are required to tax sales based on the location 
of the company/store and the location of the consumer.  
States can legally charge a sales tax only when there is 
proof of sufficient physical presence in the state by the 
retailer. (Aveyard, Pitt, and Bussy, 2000) Because of the 
Supreme Court decision, Quill Corp. vs. North Dakota in 
1992, Congress has the ability to enact legislation giving 
states the power to levy sales tax on businesses without 
sufficient physical presence.  However, since they have 
not done this and physical presence in a state by a web 
retailer is difficult to prove, any sales tax "requested" by a 
state for e-commerce sales is non-enforceable.   The 
ability of the Internet company to waive tax payments 
gives them an artificial cost advantage and allows them to 
offer the good at a lower price.  According to EEI 
Resources, this is a subsidy.  
However, the tax exemption status might not be 
considered a pure subsidy.  This is because any company 
has the ability to sell goods and services over the Internet. 
The choice not to sell over the Internet is just that, a 
choice.  Thus, this is unlike accepted subsidies in trade 
because companies are not able to claim domicile in 
multiple countries.  If it were like the accepted models for 
trade, a store could not sell goods via catalog or the 
Internet.  Likewise, a catalog company could not sell its 
wares over the Internet or in a store. 
 
2.2 Efficiency of Subsidies 
   
Subsidies, by definition, are not efficient.  Efficiency 
denotes the distribution of resources to those who value it 
most.  Efficiency is the basis of competition. A company 
that is unable to efficiently produce a good or a service 
that consumers value will see decreased sales revenues, 
and will be ultimately forced out of business.  Recall that 
a subsidy gives a company an artificial cost advantage.  
Part of the costs of production is covered by the subsidy. 
Figure 1A includes a Demand Curve denoted by the 
function: P = -αQ + β, where α and β are positive 
constants.  The Supply curve, SE1 , represents the function 
P= φQ + γ, where φ and γ are positive constants.  The new 
Supply curve, SE2  , is denoted by the equation: P = φQ + 
(γ+λ); where λ is a positive constant, and is the value of 
the tax exemption.  As shown in Figures 1A and 1B, the 
subsidy will cause an outward shift in the supply curve for 
Internet companies of good Z from SE1 to SE2.  This will 
cause a lower equilibrium price (P2) and a higher 
equilibrium quantity (Q2).  The catalog companies and 
stores will not experience the cost advantage, and as a 
result their supply curve will not shift.  Their Demand and 
Supply curves will remain P = -αQ + β, and P= φQ + γ 
respectively. Their equilibrium price and quantity will 
remain at P1 and Q1 respectively. 
Figure 1: The Effect of a Subsidy on Subsidized and Non-
Subsidized Suppliers 
Price      
      
   SE1 SE2 
           P1  
         P2 
      
  Q1    Q2         Quantity 
 
  (A): Internet Companies 
 Price  
 
    SCS1 
 
      P1 
 
 
     DCS1 
   Q*  Quantity 
 
  (B): Catalog Companies and Stores 
If the internet companies see a large enough increase 
in market share to influence the overall equilibrium, i.e., 
they become the price setters rather than price takers, then 
their ability to serve the consumer at the lowered price of 
P2 will cause catalog and store companies to be driven out 
of business. This will be true even if these suppliers are 
more cost effective as producers than the Internet 
company.  Thus, it is possible that the more efficient 
company or companies will not be the ones who are 
producing the good.  
 




Social Welfare considers not only what an 
observable outcome of an event is, but also the 
desirability of the outcome.  The purpose behind a 
subsidy is to support a needed industry that would 
otherwise fail in a competitive market (farming, for 
example) or to spur new research in the area.  The 
community as a whole deems that the positive result of 
Hypothesis #2  The effect of the tax exemption is to 
diminish  the level of efficiency in the sales market. 
Hypothesis #3 Social Welfare may be increased by 
the tax exemption even if it is a subsidy. 
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the subsidy outweighs the negative aspects of efficiency.  
Thus, although a subsidy for Internet commerce may be 
inefficient, it might still be desirable for the greater 
community good. The model used to determine the social 
welfare impact of the subsidy given to the Internet 
companies is that used by Price (1995). Price's paper on 
discrimination and subsidies uses the Nash Equilibrium to 
construct the pricing possibilities for two firms; one that 
is being discriminated against, and one that is not.  
From Price's paper we find that subsidies only 
increase social welfare if the probability of discrimination 
is less than 50%.  If the probability of discrimination is 
50%, then social welfare is unchanged; and at a rate 
higher than 50%, social welfare is decreased. Social 
welfare is given by W(N) = U[Q(N)] -nbk.  Here, k is the 
required subsidy to the firms that are discriminated 
against, Q(N) is the market output of N firms, and where 
nb is the number of firms that are discriminated against.  
Thus according to Price, k = p1-(1-τ) p1  . τ is the 
probability that there will be discrimination.  The change 
in social welfare associated with the existence of the firm 
that is being discriminated against is [∆W(N)] / [∆nb] = 
p1-(1-τ) p1. The change in social welfare becomes  
[∆W(N)] / [∆nb] = (.5-τ)p1. The conclusion drawn from 
the paper written by Price is that if the probability of 
discrimination is greater than 50%, then social welfare 
will be adversely affected by the subsidy. 
Therefore, if the probability of discrimination against 
Internet sales companies is greater than 50%, then the tax 
exemption afforded to those companies has a negative 
impact on social welfare. 
 
3. Methodology 
Data for this paper will be determined by survey. We 
are at the point now of searching for scientific surveys. 
Surveys that are being considered for this paper are those 
done by the U.S. Census Bureau, Survey.Net, and NUA 
Analysis of E-Commerce.  These surveys have a 
substantial respondent size (2000 - 200,000), and when 
used in conjunction will show a diverse sampling of the 
consumer population.  These surveys will be used to 
observe changes in consumer spending, buying 
preferences, and computer usage.  The results of this 
survey will be used to determine if discrimination against 
Internet companies exists. The probability of 
discrimination will be used in the Price model for social 
welfare to determine what effect the existence of the tax 
exemption has on overall social welfare. 
 
4. Expected Findings on Efficiency and 
Subsidies 
The tax exemption offered to the Internet companies 
acts as a subsidy.  It gives an artificial cost benefit to 
those companies that sell their goods or services over the 
web.  Given the same cost of production, these companies 
will have an unfair advantage over the catalog and 
mainstream store companies. 
According to the philosophy of Adam Smith in the 
ideal of comparative advantage, given a fair playing field, 
those companies that produce goods the cheapest and the 
best are the ones that should be and will be ultimately the 
producers of the good or service. From this standpoint, 
the subsidy of a tax exemption encourages inefficiency by 
keeping afloat companies that do not meet what the 
consumers value most. 
According to the model derived in the Methodology 
section, we know that social welfare is only positively 
affected in the long run if the probability of 
discrimination is less than 50%. This means that if the 
probability of discrimination against a firm or type of firm 
is greater than 50%, the subsidy that ensures the entrance 
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